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Abstract
The paper reports results on the e¤ects of stylized stabilization policies on
endogenously created ‡uctuations. A simple monetary model with intertem-
porally optimizing agents is considered. Fluctuations in output may occur
due to ‡uctuations in labor supply which are again caused by volatile expec-
tations which are ”self ful…lling”, i.e. correct given the model. It turns out
that stabilization policies that are su¢ciently countercyclical in the sense that
government spending (on transfers or demand) depends su¢ciently strongly
negatively on GNP-increases can stabilize the economy at a monetary steady
state for an arbitrarily low degree of distortion of that steady state. Such
stabilization has unambiguously good welfare e¤ects and can be achieved
without features such as positive lump sum taxation or negative income tax-
ation as part of the stabilization policy.
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The present paper argues that, even under perfectly competitive conditions, if en-
dogenous output ‡uctuations due to self-ful…lling volatile expectations occur, there
may be good and welfare based reasons for stabilization policies that involve (a
certain kind of) countercyclicality in government activity. By pursuing a su¢-
ciently countercyclical stabilization policy the government may be able to stabilize
output at a monetary steady state for an arbitrarily small degree of distortion of
that steady state. Such stabilization has good welfare e¤ects. These e¤ects can be
achieved by stabilization policies that do not involve features such as positive lump
sum taxation or negative income taxation.
We study a simple monetary dynamic model with intertemporally optimizing
agents and only labor as input in production. The model can be interpreted either
as an overlapping generations model or, by the argument of Woodford (1986), as a
model with in…nitely lived agents and cash-in-advance constraints. There is always a
unique monetary steady state, but there may also be rational expectations equilibria
exhibiting endogenous ‡uctuations, deterministic cycles or sunspot equilibria. In
such equilibria output ‡uctuates because of variations in labor supply which are
again due to self-ful…lling volatile expectations. In the considered simple model the
condition for indeterminacy under laissez faire, implying the existence of endogenous
‡uctuations, is the one well-known from, e.g. Grandmont (1985), that the elasticity
of labor supply with respect to the real wage is less than minus one half. However,
the results on stabilization reported here are of relevance also for other models of
endogenous competitive ‡uctuations where variations in the labor supply, driven by
self-ful…lling variations in expectations, cause output to ‡uctuate.
The real spending of the model’s government can be interpreted either as real
lump sum transfers (to the old) or as government demand for output. If govern-
ment and private demand are assumed to be perfect substitutes real transfers and
government demand work in exactly the same way. The government’s spending is
…nanced either by direct proportional income taxation or by seigniorage, the latter
leading to in‡ationary taxation. The exact mix does not matter since direct pro-
portional and in‡ationary taxation work in the same way in the considered model.
All the policy rules studied can therefore be interpreted as balanced-budget rules.
1Government spending implies one form of taxation or the other and therefore
distorts labor supply. For this reason, as far as steady state is concerned, govern-
ment spending is unambiguously bad for welfare. On the other hand, due to the
concavity of utility functions, if an endogenous ‡uctuation is the relevant dynamic
equilibrium, government activity may have good welfare e¤ects if it can help to
stabilize output. In this case, however, the distortionary e¤ect of the government’s
spending will still be present and should be weighted against any stabilization ben-
e…ts obtained by the spending policy.
We assume that government spending is linked to the performance of the econ-
omy through policy rules which are meant to formalize stabilization principles. We
axiomatize a simple class of rules according to which real government spending is
always positive and depends homogeneously on the current and the past levels of
GNP. The axioms exclude from the considered policy rules such exotic features as
negative transfers (positive lump sum taxes), earnings subsidies (negative propor-
tional taxes), and that government is inactive at a steady (state) GNP, but pays
negative or positive transfers at varying (or di¤erent) activity levels. The rules are
such that at a constant GNP, the share of government spending in GNP is given
by a certain level (or taxation) parameter ¯, 0 ￿ ¯ < 1. The larger ¯ is the more
distorted will the monetary steady state be, since a larger ¯ means higher (direct
or in‡ationary) taxation at a constant GNP. For varying GNP each rule involves a
certain dependence of the share of government spending in GNP on GNP-increases.
If this dependence is negative the rule is said to be countercyclical, and more so
the stronger the dependence is. If the dependence is positive, the rule is called
procyclical etc.
The main result of this paper is the demonstration that for all positive values
of ¯, including arbitrarily small values, one can, by using a su¢ciently counter-
cyclical policy rule, obtain that the unique monetary steady state given ¯ becomes
(globally) determinate, and hence becomes the relevant dynamic equilibrium. Or
in other words, one can stabilize the economy at a steady state having to accept
only an arbitrarily small degree of distortion of that steady state by conducting
a su¢ciently countercyclical stabilization policy. Such a policy has good welfare
e¤ects: It stabilizes the economy arbitrarily close to an e¢cient steady state, and
it eliminates ‡uctuations in output which are in themselves bad for welfare because
2of the concavity of utility functions. On the other hand we also show that for very
low values of ¯, indeed very strong degrees of countercyclicality are required.
We showsome side results too. If one …xes the cyclicality of the policy rule at just
slightly countercyclical, then ”enough government”, a su¢ciently large ¯, will create
determinacy. On the other hand, if the rule is …xed to be just slightly procyclical,
a su¢ciently large ¯ will create indeterminacy. For the limiting case of an acyclical
policy rule, where government spending is exactly proportional to current GNP, it
turns out that large government will create determinacy or indeterminacy depending
on the fundamentals of the economy.
The present paper is related to the (somewhat early) contributions Grandmont
(1986), Goenka (1994), Sims (1994), and Woodford (1994), which also study the
e¤ects of …xed and supposedly realistic policy rules on endogenous ‡uctuations.
The closest relation is to Grandmont (1986). As will be shown, the just described
particular case of an acyclical policy rule is equivalent to arranging spending such
that, in the absence of direct income taxation, a constant money growth rate results.
Grandmont exactly studies such constant money growth rules. His main …nding is
that, under his assumptions on fundamentals, constant money growth rules will
stabilize the economy at a monetary steady state if the money growth rate is large
enough. Our results indicate that constant money growth rules are, at best, very
poor stabilization instruments. First, the fact that we here include more di¤erent
assumptions on fundamentals reveals that constant money growth rules, although
e¤ective in stabilizing output under some assumptions on fundamentals, are directly
destabilizing under other assumptions. Second, our analysis of a broad class of
parametrized policy rules reveals that the particular constant money growth rules
are just at the boundary of the set of policy rules that can be output stabilizing at
all, and when they are in this set, they are outperformed by countercyclical rules
with respect to the welfare consequences of stabilization.
Our paper is also related to a more recent wave of papers, Guo and Lansing
(1997) and (1998), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) and (2000), Chattopadhyay
(1996) and (1999), Christiano and Harrison (1999), and Guo and Harrison (1999),
but our results are di¤erent. The papers of Guo and Lansing, Christiano and
Harrison, and Guo and Harrison consider models in which the source of endogenous
‡uctuations is explicitly to be found in a productive externality and their results
3on stabilization depend on this feature. Here we assume no such externality. For
instance, Guo and Lansing presents the interesting result that with externality
based ‡uctuations, progressive taxation may help to create determinacy. Here we
only consider proportional taxation. Further, in Guo and Lansing’s work one cannot
be sure that stabilization has good welfare e¤ects, since output varying between high
and low may utilize the externality better than output being at a moderate level
all the time. Our emphasize is on stabilization for welfare reasons.
Christiano and Harrison (1999), the closest related of the more recent papers, do
obtain stabilization on an e¢cient steady state by means of a policy that involves
proportional tax rates that increase with employment. However, at the steady
state at which the economy is stabilized the tax rate is zero, or even negative to
internalize the productive externality, while the policy works through threatening
with/promising lower and hence negative tax rates (earnings subsidies) combined
with positive lump sum taxation at lower levels of employment etc. We have at-
tempted to avoid such rarely seen features, or in other words, the kind of policies
considered by Christiano and Harrison (1999) are not among the policy rules we
consider. In an overall comparison, we avoid some less realistic features in the con-
sidered stabilization policies; we that the cost of this is that in the statement ”the
economy can be stabilized at an e¢cient steady state” the word at must be replaced
by arbitrarily close to.
Other papers among the more recent are focused on the negative result that
policy may create indeterminacy. For instance Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe show how
balanced budget rules may be destabilizing for su¢ciently large government. Since
our policy rules can be interpreted as balanced budget rules this result is closely
related to the above mentioned one that with pro- or a-cyclical policy rules enough
government may create indeterminacy. Our emphasize, however, is on the positive
result that countercyclical policy rules may stabilize output in a good way.
One feature of the model we study is that it is simple enough to give a one-
dimensional, …rst order di¤erence equation as perfect foresight dynamic. This makes
it possible to establish enough global properties to be able to use global determinacy
as criterion for stabilization. Like Christiano and Harrison (1999), we think that
in connection with excluding the possibility of cycles and sunspot equilibria global
analysis is of importance, since local determinacy is not a su¢cient condition for the
4non-existence of endogenous ‡uctuations. With two-dimensional dynamic systems
it is very di¢cult to provide more than local analysis. This is our motivation for
studying a simple model without capital.
In Section 2 we describe the basics of the economic model and the class of
policy rules we consider. Section 3 derives the equilibrium dynamics, and Section 4
states the results on stabilization by the considered policy rules. Section 5 contains
remarks and conclusions. Proofs are given in Appendix A. Appendix B contains a
technical result that is of importance for our purposes.
2 Basics
We consider a model in discrete time with intertemporally optimizing agents. The
model can be interpreted either as an overlapping generations model or as a model
with in…nitely lived consumers. In each period the commodities are labor, output,
and money. The money prices of labor and output are w > 0 and p > 0 respectively,
and labor and output markets are perfectly competitive. Subscript t is used for
explicit reference to a period.
In each period a representative …rm produces output y ¸ 0 from labor input
l ¸ 0 under constant returns to scale, y = l.
For the overlapping generations interpretation of the model there is in each
period one young and one old consumer, and a consumer is endowed with one unit
of labor time in his youth. The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of a
consumer is u(c) + v(e), where c ¸ 0 is output consumption in the consumer’s old
age, and e := 1 ¡ n ¸ 0 is leisure consumption in the youth; n is labor supply.
It is thus assumed that in the …rst period of a consumer’s life only leisure enters
utility, and in the second only consumption. As explained by Woodford (1986), this
implies an equivalence to a cash-in-advance constrained economy with an in…nitely-
lived representative consumer, if it is assumed that this consumer’s time preference
rate is su¢ciently large. In this interpretation the period length can be short.
We impose standard assumptions on u and v: they are continuously di¤eren-
tiable several times, u0(c) and v0(e) are strictly positive and go to in…nity as c and
e respectively go to zero, and u00(c) and v00(e) are strictly negative. We denote the
Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion in u by R(c) := ¡u00(c)c=u0(c) > 0,
5and also de…ne N(n) := ¡v00(1 ¡ n)n=v0(1 ¡ n) > 0. We assume that R(0) :=
limc!0R(c), and N(0) both exist (are < 1).
Finally, there is a government that in each period decides on a real lump sum
transfer b given to the period’s old consumer, and on a proportional tax rate ¿,
where 0 ￿ ¿ < 1, by which the income of the period’s young consumer is taxed.
Both b and ¿ are taken as parametric by the consumers. For the interpretation
of our model with an in…nitely-lived agent, the cash-in-advance constraint should
be assumed to work such that in the current period the consumer can spend last
period’s net of tax income plus the transfer received in the current period.
The variable b can, if positive, alternatively be interpreted as government de-
mand for output (or labor). If it is assumed that public and private goods are
perfect substitutes, so the utility function of a consumer is v(1¡n)+u(c+b), then
the resulting dynamic model will be identical to the one in which b is a transfer.
This will be demonstrated below.
Policy is conducted according to certain feedback rules linking in a systematic
way the value of the real transfer, or government demand, to present and past values
of the GNP. The rules are meant to formalize stabilization principles. Government
spending is …nanced by either proportional taxation or seigniorage or a mix of
both, so the government budget constraint is ful…lled. The exact …nancing does not
matter since in the considered model direct proportional taxation and in‡ationary
taxation have the same e¤ects.
We con…ne attention to rules of the form, bt+1 = b(yt+1;yt), and impose some
further restrictions meant to express that the policy rules b(¢;¢) should be realistic
stabilization principles:
(i) The variable b is weakly positive in all periods. For the interpretation of b as
government demand this is required. For the interpretation as a transfer there is in
principle nothing wrong with negative values, but b < 0 means lump sum taxation
(of the old) together with subsidies (to the young) proportional to income, these
subsidies coming either directly or through negative in‡ation. Such features are
seldom observed and, in particular, variations in lump sum taxes are never seen as
part of stabilization policies.
(ii) At a constant GNP, the government behaves as if it taxes GNP by a certain
rate and balances the budget in each period. That is, we require b(y;y) = ¯y for
6some ¯ with 0 ￿ ¯ < 1. Indeed, to be a formalization of a stabilization principle the
rule should dictate ”neutral government behavior” at a steady GNP. For realism we
let neutral behavior correspond to …xed proportional taxation and budget balance
rather than, e.g. to a …xed spending that is independent of y.
(iii) When GNP varies the stabilization e¤ort should depend on the relative
variation in GNP. If two pairs (x;y) and (x0;y0) of current and past GNPs represent
the same degree of relative up or down swing in economic activity, x=y = x0=y0,
then the government stabilization e¤ort should be relatively the same in the two
situations, i.e. b(x;y)=x = b(x0;y0)=x0.
These requirements are ful…lled if and only if b is of the form b(yt+1;yt) =
¯Á(yt+1;yt), where 0 ￿ ¯ < 1, and Á is positive and homogeneous of degree one,






where there are no a priori restrictions on the parameter ®.
By virtue of mainly (i) and (ii) above we avoid to consider policy rules that
prescribe zero government activity at a constant production level and negative or
positive values of b otherwise. If there is government activity at all (¯ > 0), there
is also government activity at a constant GNP.
Each policy rule of the form (1) contains a level (or resting) component given
by ¯, and a cyclical (or reactive) component given by ®. This is illustrated by the
rewriting b(yt+1;yt)=yt+1 = ¯(yt+1=yt)¡®. The level component ¯ is spending’s share
in current output when output is constant, and the cyclical component (yt+1=yt)¡®
is the responsiveness of this share to changes in output, ¡® being the elasticity of
the spending’s share with respect to the output growth factor. The larger ® is, the
more negative will be the reaction in spending’s share to increases in output, that
is, the more ”countercyclical” will the rule be.
In what follows it is assumed that the policy rule b(yt+1;yt) used by the govern-
ment is known by the households who also have rational expectations with respect
to next period’s output price. Furthermore, the households are assumed to believe
in the relevant policy rule.
73 Equilibrium
In (a non-trivial) equilibrium one must have w = p in all periods, and that any
level of production and employment is optimal for the …rm.
Consider a (young) consumer who holds the expectation concerning the next
period that with probability qj the output price will be pj and the transfer received
will be bj, where j = 1;:::;r. A point expectation corresponds to r = 1. The con-
sumer chooses current labor supply n, ultimo money holding m, and consumption cj
in each of the r future ”states”, to maximize expected utility v(1¡n)+
P
j qju(cj),
subject to the budget constraints m = (1¡¿)wn, and cj = m=pj+bj for j = 1;:::;r,
where w and ¿ are the nominal wage rate and the tax rate in the period where the











and the budget constraints,
cj = (1 ¡ ¿)
w
pj
n + bj for j = 1;:::;r: (3)
In the case of a point expectation (where p and b are expected), the optimality
conditions amount to v0(1 ¡ n) = !u0(c), and c = !n + b, where ! := (1 ¡ ¿)w=p.
Solving for n and c gives the labor supply curve n = n(!;b), and the future demand
for produced goods c = c(!;b). It is a consequence of our assumptions that leisure
and consumption are both strict normal goods, n0
b < 0 and c0
b > 0.1
3.1 Temporary Equilibrium
From (3), (1 ¡ ¿)w=pj = (cj ¡ bj)=n. Inserting this into (2) gives, nv0(1 ¡ n) =
P
j qj(cj ¡bj)u0(cj): Inserting the equilibrium conditions for the labor market n = l,
and the output market yj = cj (the resource constraint), and using y = l, gives
1Labor supply is given by v0(1 ¡ n) = !u0(!n + b). A larger b implies a lower right hand side,
and to recreate equality n must fall since this both decreases the left hand, and increases the right
hand, side, so n0
b < 0. A similar exercise on v0(1¡(c¡b)=!) = !u0(c) shows c0
b > 0. For later use,






1 ¡ R(!n + b) !n
!n+b
N(n) + R(!n + b) !n
!n+b
> ¡1:
8yv0(1 ¡ y) =
P
j qj(yj ¡ bj)u0(yj). Inserting …nally the policy rule bj = b(yj;y)
yields,
yv
0(1 ¡ y) =
r X
j=1
qj [yj ¡ b(yj;y)]u
0(yj): (4)
This is the temporary equilibrium equation for the considered economy in terms of
production levels. If the young consumer expects output in the next period to be
yj (between zero and one) with probability qj, j = 1;:::;r, and knows and believes
in the policy rule b(¢;¢), then a y (between zero and one) is an equilibrium output
of the current period if and only if it ful…ls (4).
All rational expectations dynamic equilibria studied below are de…ned from the
temporary equilibrium equation (4). The tax rates do not enter into this. Hence, for
a given policy rule for spending, the rational expectations equilibrium dynamics of
the considered economy is independent of how much income taxation vs. seignior-
age is used in …nancing government spending. Proportional income taxation and
in‡ationary taxation work in exactly the same way.
Consider the alternative interpretation of b as government demand. In this
case, the consumer would maximize v(1¡n)+
P
j qju(cj +bj) subject to the budget
constraints cj = (1 ¡ ¿) w










By use of the budget constraints, (1 ¡ ¿)w=pj = cj=n, one gets nv0(1 ¡ n) =
P
j qjcju0(cj + bj): In equilibrium, n = y and yj = cj + bj, and hence yv0(1 ¡ y) =
P
j qj(yj ¡ bj)u0(yj). Inserting a policy rule for government demand, bj = b(yj;y),
would give exactly (4). The two interpretations of b lead to the same equilibrium
condition which veri…es the equivalence postulated in Section 2.
3.2 Perfect Foresight Dynamics and Steady State
The economy’s perfect foresight dynamics is obtained from (4) assuming that the
next period’s output is correctly foreseen from the current period in a deterministic
sense. Inserting yj = yt+1 for all j, and writing current output as yt (for y), one
arrives at a …rst order, one-dimensional di¤erence equation in yt and yt+1,
ytv
0(1 ¡ yt) = [yt+1 ¡ b(yt+1;yt)]u
0(yt+1)): (5)
9A dynamic perfect foresight equilibrium is a sequence (yt) of production levels
0 ￿ yt < 1, such that (5) is ful…lled for all t. A steady state is a particular case
where yt = y in all periods. For all the policy rules we consider, b(y;y) = ¯y, and it
follows from (5) that a strictly positive, or monetary, steady state production level
y is given by,
v0(1 ¡ y)
u0(y)
= 1 ¡ ¯: (6)
Since the MRS on the left hand side goes from zero to in…nity as y goes from zero
to one, there is for any ¯ a unique monetary steady state y(¯), and y(¯) < 1. It
follows directly that y(¯) is strictly decreasing in ¯, and that y(¯) goes to zero as
¯ goes to one.
If we de…ne welfare at the monetary steady state as the common utility of all
”generations”, W(¯) := u(y(¯)) + v(1 ¡ y(¯)), then W 0 = (u0 ¡ v0)y0
¯, and from
y0
¯ < 0 and (6), W 0 < 0 for all ¯ > 0, and W 0 = 0 for ¯ = 0. This proves,
Proposition A. For all ¯, there is a unique monetary steady state involving
production y(¯), with 0 < y(¯) < 1, and y(¯) is strictly decreasing in ¯ and
y(¯) ! 0 as ¯ ! 1. Welfare at the monetary steady state W(¯) is unambiguously
decreasing in ¯, and optimal policy for steady state is ¯ = 0.
Proposition A implies that government activity has to be motivated by the mon-
etary steady state not being the appropriate descriptive equilibrium. Furthermore,
should endogenous ‡uctuations prevail (under laissez faire) and should one, by use
of a policy rule belonging to the considered class, manage to stabilize the economy
at the monetary steady state, then it is unambiguously to be preferred that this is
done for as low a value of ¯ as possible.2
The left hand side of (5) increases from zero to in…nity as yt goes from zero
to one. If ® ¸ 0, or ¯ = 0, then b is (weakly) increasing in yt, so the right hand
side will, for any given yt+1 > 0, decrease weakly from a strictly positive value as
yt increases from zero. This means that for every positive yt+1, there is a unique
yt between zero and one that solves (5), which thus everywhere implicitly de…nes
2It could be argued that the right welfare measure at steady state is rather V (¯) = u(y(¯))=(1+
µ) + v(1 ¡ y(¯)), where µ > 0 is a time preference rate. In a free optimization one will then …nd
that optimal policy for steady state is some ¯ < 0, which, in the absence of direct taxation, is
equivalent to a constant negative money growth rate, a so-called Friedman rule. If one only allows
¯ ¸ 0, then also in this case ¯ = 0 is optimal for steady state.
10yt as a function f of yt+1. From the Implicit Function Theorem, f is continuously
di¤erentiable. So, for ® ¸ 0, or ¯ = 0, the backward perfect foresight dynamic
yt = f(yt+1) is well-de…ned globally. For ® < 0 and ¯ > 0 it is not. In that case
there are for yt+1 small enough several solutions in yt to (5), and for yt+1 large
enough there are none. As just shown there is, however, a unique monetary steady
state y(¯), and locally around y(¯) the backward perfect foresight dynamic f is
again well-de…ned and continuously di¤erentiable.3
3.3 Rational Expectations Fluctuations
A deterministic r-cycle is a collection of r di¤erent production levels 0 < y1;:::;yr <
1 in the range where f is well-de…ned such that y1 = f(y2);:::;yr = f(y1). An r-
state stationary (Markov) sunspot equilibrium, SSE, consists of r production levels
0 < y1 ￿ ¢¢¢ ￿ yr < 1, where y1 < yr, and r2 transition probabilities qij,
Pr
j=1qij = 1
for i = 1;:::;r, where the matrix (qij) is irreducible, such that, whenever the young
consumer expects that the output level yj will occur with probability qij next period,
j = 1;:::;r, then the current temporary equilibrium output level according to (4) is
exactly yi, that is,
yiv
0(1 ¡ yi) =
r X
j=1
qij [yj ¡ b(yj;yi)]u
0(yj) for i = 1;:::;r: (7)
The well-known idea is that one can imagine that an irreducible Markov chain (a
sunspot) on states 1;:::;r, sending state i into state j with transition probability
qij, though exogenous to the economic system, may govern its performance. If
the agents know the transition probabilities and believe that in any period output
must be yi if the state is i, then output will indeed be governed by the sunspot
and ‡uctuate accordingly, and the agents will have no reason to revise their beliefs
since their expectations are probabilistically correct, i.e. rational. An r-cycle is a
particular, non-stochastic r-state SSE.
Deterministic cycles and SSE are our candidates for rational expectations dy-
namic equilibria exhibiting endogenous ‡uctuations.
3From the Implicit Function Theorem, f is locally well-de…ned by (5) around steady state if
the derivative of ytv0(1 ¡ yt) ¡ [yt+1 ¡ b(yt+1;yt)]u0(yt+1)) wrt. yt measured at steady state is
not zero. This derivative is v0(1¡y(¯))(1+N(y(¯))+®¯u0(y(¯)), which, for any given ¯, is zero
only for one particular (non-generic) negative value of ®.
11Our results concerning stabilization of endogenous business cycles will rely on
some relationships between the perfect foresight dynamic f and the existence of
cycles and sunspot equilibria. It is well-known that if f is such that an r-cycle exists
then there is also a truly stochastic r-state SSE close to the cycle, see Guesnerie
and Woodford (1992). It is not generally true that the existence of a SSE implies
the existence of deterministic cycles, or, equivalently, that non-existence of cycles
implies non-existence of SSE. For our purposes it is, however, important to establish
such a connection. In Appendix B we prove a proposition stating some general
conditions under which the existence of a SSE implies the existence of a 2-period
cycle. The conditions are such that for the policy rules for which we show, that
they eliminate all cycles through establishing global stability according to f of the
monetary steady state, it can be concluded that also all SSE are eliminated.4 By
virtue of these and some other well-known results it will su¢ce in what follows
to study the perfect foresight dynamic f. To be precise we will make use of the
following standard ”dynamic properties”:
Indeterminacy. If f is locally well-de…ned around steady state and the slope of f
at the steady state is below minus one or above one, then the steady state is locally
stable in the forward direction under perfect foresight, and the steady state is said
to be indeterminate. It is well known that indeterminacy implies the existence of
SSE arbitrarily close to the steady state, see Guesnerie and Woodford (1992), and
for the dynamics we consider, if f0(y(¯)) < ¡1, there are also deterministic cycles.
It is an ”opening assumption” of ours that under laissez faire the steady state is
indeterminate, f0(y(0)) < ¡1 (> 1 is not possible), and that indeterminacy indeed
implies that a cycle or a sunspot equilibrium is the relevant dynamic equilibrium
(if it were the steady state there would be no stabilization problem).
Determinacy. Assume that by appropriate use of one of the policy rules consid-
ered it can be obtained that the steady state y(¯) becomes globally stable according
to f, implying that f is globally well-de…ned. Then there can be no deterministic
cycles and, from Theorem B shown in Appendix B, for the policy rules that we …nd
indeed can make y(¯) globally stable according to f, no SSE either. The steady
4The method used in Appendix B to establish that existence of a SSE implies existence of a
2-period cycle is similar to the one used by Grandmont (1986). However, the dynamics arising
from our policy rules are not covered by the generality of Grandmont’s result. Therefore the
theorem in Appendix B generalizes Grandmont’s result and it may be of independent interest.
12state is then the only reasonable bounded and continuously well-de…ned rational
expectations equilibrium, and one says that the steady state is (globally) deter-
minate. Determinacy will be considered a su¢cient condition for stabilization at
steady state.
4 Stabilization
Our main result is Theorem 1 below which says that for any given positive value of
¯ (no matter how small), one can create determinacy by choosing ® large enough,
or in other words, stabilization at the monetary steady state can be obtained with
arbitrarily little distortion by using a su¢ciently countercyclical stabilization prin-
ciple. However, very high values of ® are indeed required for very low values of
¯.
Theorem 1. Assume f0(y(0)) < ¡1. For any ¯ > 0, there is an ®¤(¯) > 0,
such that if a policy rule with ® > ®¤(¯) and ¯ is used, then the steady state y(¯)
is determinate and there are no cycles or stationary sunspot equilibria. On the
other hand, for all su¢ciently small ¯ > 0, it is necessary for determinacy that ®
is greater than or equal to a certain ®¤¤(¯_ ) > 0, and this ®¤¤(¯_ ) goes to in…nity as
¯ goes to zero.
Theorem 1 is about stabilization by appropriate choice of ® for a given …xed
¯. This is the most interesting question from a welfare viewpoint. It is also of
interest to investigate what can be obtained in terms of stabilization for a given ®
by appropriate choice of the ”size of government” ¯, for instance because there may
be limits to how countercyclical stabilization policies can be.
Proposition 1. Assume f0(y(0)) < ¡1.
(i) For any ® > 0, there is a ¯
¤(®) with 0 < ¯
¤(®) < 1, such that if a policy
rule with ® and ¯ > ¯
¤(®) is used, then the steady state y(¯) is determinate and
there are no cycles or stationary sunspot equilibria.
(ii) If ® = 0 and R(0) < 1, there also exists a ¯
¤ < 1, such that ¯ > ¯
¤ implies
determinacy of the steady state and non-existence of cycles and stationary sunspot
equilibria..
Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 leave some questions open. Proposition 1 does not
13exclude that also for ® < 0 (or generally for ® = 0), could ”enough government”,
a su¢ciently high ¯, imply determinacy. Nor does Theorem 1 exclude that also
negative and numerically large values of ® could be stabilizing for certain (low)
values of ¯. Proposition 2, however, rules out these possibilities. Note that it is not
assumed in Proposition 2 that f0(y(0)) < ¡1. Hence Proposition 2 is about how
policy can create indeterminacy, see also Remark 6 below.
Proposition 2. (i) If ¯ > 0, then f0(y(¯)) > 1 for all negative and su¢ciently
small ®; hence, the steady state y(¯) is indeterminate and stationary sunspot equi-
libria exist.
(ii) If ® < 0, then f0(y(¯)) > 1 for all su¢ciently large ¯; hence, the steady
state y(¯) is indeterminate and stationary sunspot equilibria exist.
(iii) If ® = 0 and R(0) > 2+ N(0), then f0(y(¯)) < ¡1 for all su¢ciently large
¯; hence, the steady state y(¯) is indeterminate and both deterministic cycles and
stationary sunspot equilibria exist.
5 Remarks
1. Welfare. The above results are strictly speaking on stabilization of output which
should only be an aim for economic policy if output stabilization has good welfare
implications. First note that the welfare e¤ects are potentially good in the sense
that the economy can be stabilized arbitrarily close to y(0), the e¢cient steady
state under laissez faire. This does not imply, however, that the stabilized situation
Pareto dominates a ‡uctuating one. What speaks in favor of this latter eventuality
is the concavity of utility functions (more so in the model interpretation with an
in…nitely lived consumer than in the overlapping generations interpretation where a
concern of intergenerational equity must be added to motivate output stabilization).
What speaks against it is the distortion of the steady state that the stabilization
policy implies. The power of Theorem 1 is exactly that it says that stabilization
at steady state can be obtained for (arbitrarily) little such distortion of the steady
state by performing stabilization through a su¢ciently countercyclical policy rule.
The welfare implications of such stabilization should be unambiguously good.
2. Countercyclicality. The best policy rules thus entail positive values of ®.
Hence they are countercyclical in the sense that they imply relatively low gov-
14ernment activity in periods up to which output has increased by a relatively large
amount. Though this is not exactly countercyclicality in the usual sense of relatively
low government activity when output is relatively high, such rules will, nevertheless,
often appear countercyclical in the usual sense (e.g. over two-period cycles), and
they certainly do have a Keynesian ‡avor - but not for Keynesian reasons.
3. Intuition. Why is it that the countercyclical policy rules stabilize output most
e¤ectively, and hence with the best welfare implications? The intuition is related
to the intertemporal incentive e¤ects of systematic stabilization policies. Assume
that GNP increases (by a relatively large amount) from one period to the next.
If this is correctly foreseen from the …rst period, and people know and believe in
a countercyclical policy rule, then they will expect relatively low transfers during
the next period. If leisure and output are normal goods (which is realistic), labor
supply and output will increase in the …rst period, and thus the increase in output
from the …rst to the second period will be reduced. The economy is thus stabilized.
Interestingly, Benassy (1998) …nds that a similar intertemporal e¤ect is important
for the stabilization of competitive ‡uctuations caused by exogenous shocks, and
Benassy also establishes support for countercyclical policy rules.
4. Related literature. Grandmont (1986) has assumptions with the same e¤ect
as R(0) < 1 here and considers constant money growth rate rules which are equiv-
alent to our rules with ® = 0.5 One of his results is similar to our Proposition 1(ii).
In view of Propositions 1 and 2, policy rules with ® = 0 are just at the boundary of
the set of rules that can be stabilizing for large enough values of ¯, and even when
they are in this set, they may well be the ones giving output stabilization in the
worst possible way welfarewise, requiring the largest ¯.
5. A trade o¤. There may be limits to how countercyclical policy rules can be.
5The case ® = 0, gives b(yt+1;yt) = ¯yt+1. This rule is equivalent to arranging the sequence
of transfers such that with no income taxation a constant money growth rate results. To see
this note that without income taxation the money stock must evolve as Mt+1 ¡ Mt = pt+1bt+1.
The growth rate dt+1 of the money stock from the end of period t to the end of period t + 1
is thus dt+1 = pt+1bt+1=Mt () Mt = pt+1bt+1=dt+1. The second period budget constraint for
the consumer reads Mt = pt+1(ct+1 ¡ bt+1), where it is used that in equilibrium the amount
of money held by the consumer at the end of t must be the economy’s entire money stock at
the end of t. By equalizing the two expressions for Mt we get bt+1=dt+1 = ct+1 ¡ bt+1, or
bt+1 = (dt+1=(1 + dt+1))yt+1, where it was used that in equilibrium ct+1 = yt+1. Hence a rule of
no income taxation and constant money growth rate d is the particular case of a rule of the form
(??) where ® = 0 and ¯ = d=(1 + d).
15First, rules with very high values of ® and correspondingly low values of ¯ are not
simple. Second, they may involve a credibility problem. At the steady state y(¯),
at which the economy is stabilized, one will not see much government activity, only
the low ¯y(¯). The government may have problems convincing the public that this
is because ‡uctuations do not presently occur, and that should ‡uctuations occur
the government would react strongly in accordance with its high ®. There may thus
be costs in terms of losses of simplicity and credibility of increasing ®. Taking these
costs into consideration our results could be read as pointing to a basic trade o¤
between the degree of distortion and the degree of countercyclicality.
6. Policy creating indeterminacy. Inserting into the "! of footnote 2, that at
steady state !n + b = y, !n = (1 ¡ ¯)y, and b = ¯y, one gets for the real-wage
elasticity of labor supply at steady state,
"!(¯) =
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)R(y(¯))
N(y(¯)) + (1 ¡ ¯)R(y(¯))
:
From (10) in the proof of Theorem 1, f0(y(0)) < ¡1 () R(y(0)) > 2 + N(y(0)),
and this implies "!(0) < ¡1=2, the well-known condition for local indeterminacy
under laissez faire. Proposition 2 says that if ® < 0, or if ® = 0 and R(0) > 2+N(0),
a su¢cient condition for indeterminacy, f(y(¯)) < ¡1 or f(y(¯)) > 1, is ful…lled
for all su¢ciently large ¯. As ¯ goes to one, "!(¯) above goes to 1=N(0) > 0, so for
all large enough ¯, one has both indeterminacy, and "!(¯) > 0. An inappropriate
government policy may create indeterminacy, and such a policy does not have to
be more peculiar than a constant money growth rate rule. Since the policy rules
we have considered can be viewed as balanced budget rules, this …nding is closely
related to that of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997).
7. Overall conclusion. We take a modest view concerning the signi…cance for
actual stabilization policies of our model results. Insofar as ‡uctuations or cyclical
movements in economic activity can be viewed as (at least partly) created endoge-
nously by volatile and self-ful…lling expectations, some intertemporal e¤ects of sta-
bilization policies, which do not usually gain so much attention, become important.
It is a logical possibility that these intertemporal e¤ects work in such a way that
policies which stabilize economic activity in a way that is good with respect to wel-
fare involve a kind of countercyclicality in government activity that is reminiscent
of what is advocated by Keynesians.
16A Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. First note that it is an assumption in Theorem 1 that
® > 0. It therefore follows from Proposition B of Appendix B, that global stability
of y(¯) according to f (global determinacy), which is established in this proof and
which obviously eliminates all cycles, also eliminates all SSE.
Inserting the considered speci…c functional form of policy rules into (5) gives,
ytv






which de…nes yt = f(yt+1). For any x > 0, at which f(x) is well-de…ned, the slope
of f is obtained by implicit di¤erentiation of (8) written as f(x)v0(1 ¡ f(x)) =
























Measuring f0 at the monetary steady state where x = f(x) = y(¯) gives,
f
0(y(¯)) =
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ®) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)R(y(¯))
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ®) + (1 ¡ ¯)N(y(¯))
: (10)
When ® > 0, as assumed here, then f is globally well-de…ned (as explained in
Section 3.2), and for any yt+1 > 0, the yt that solves (8) is below yt+1=¯
1=®. Hence,
as yt+1 goes to zero, so must this yt, implying f(0) := limx!0f(x) = 0.
So, the globally well-de…ned backward dynamic f starts at zero, f(0) = 0, and
stays everywhere below one, f(x) < 1. It may have a number of critical points
(xc;f(xc)) at which f0(xc) = 0 (of course, for ¯ = 0 there must be critical points,
since f(0) = 0, and f0(y(0)) < ¡1). In any case, f has a shape such that if all
critical points are below the 45±-line (including the case where there are no critical
points), i.e. ful…ll f(xc)=xc < 1, then y(¯) is globally stable according to f. This is
used to establish Theorem 1.
We are going to show that one can use ®¤(¯) =
1¡¯
¯ maxx2[0;1](R(x) ¡1)). Here
®¤(¯) > 0, because it follows from f0(y(0)) < ¡1 and (10), that R(y(0)) > 1, and
0 < y(0) < 1.


















R(x) ¡ 1 + ®
: (11)
17A critical point (xc; f(xc)) is below the 45±-degree line if f(xc)=xc < 1, which has
to be ful…lled if xc ¸ 1, since f(x) < 1 for all x. The denominator above is strictly





c) ¡ 1): (12)
Now, if ® > ®¤(¯), then in particular (12) is ful…lled for any critical point xc < 1,
implying that f(xc)=xc < 1. This proves the …rst statement of Theorem 1.
For the second statement we use that it is necessary for determinacy that ¡1 ￿
f0(y(¯)) ￿ 1. From (10) one sees that if the denominator of f0(y(¯)) is negative
(which it can be for ® < 0), then f0(y(¯)) > 1. So, to exclude f0(y(¯)) > 1, one
must set ® such that the denominator is positive (for which ® ¸ 0 su¢ces). On








(R(y(¯)) ¡ N(y(¯)) ¡ 2):
From (10), f0(y(0)) < ¡1 implies R(y(0))¡N(y(0))¡2 > 0, which means that for
all small enough ¯, the parenthesis in the expression for ®¤¤(¯) is positive, so an ®
ful…lling the inequality also ful…ls ® ¸ 0. Finally, as ¯ goes to zero, the required
®¤¤(¯) goes to in…nity because the parenthesis goes to R(y(0)) ¡ N(y(0)) ¡ 2 > 0,
and (1 ¡ ¯)=¯ goes to in…nity.
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that since it is an assumption that ® ¸ 0,
it again follows from Appendix B, that global stability of y(¯) according to f
eliminates both all cycles and all SSE.
This global stability of y(¯) is again established by sending all critical points
below the 45±-line. For this to indeed imply global stability of y(¯), it is important
that f is globally well-de…ned (which it is since ® ¸ 0), and that f(0) = 0. For
® > 0 this follows as above. For ® = 0, (8) reads ytv0(1¡yt) = (1¡¯)yt+1u0(yt+1).
As yt+1 goes to zero, so will the right hand side if and only if R(0) < 1.6 Hence,
if R(0) < 1, one still has f(0) = 0, whereas if R(0) > 1 one has f(0) = 1. The
assumption R(0) < 1 in (ii) thus implies f(0) = 0 also when ® = 0.




must have 0 < ¯
¤(®) < 1, since, as above, R(y(0)) > 1, and ® > 0. From (11),




R(xc) ¡ 1 + ®
; (13)
which is ful…lled for all critical points with xc ￿ 1 when ¯ > ¯
¤(®). When xc > 1,
one has f(xc)=xc < 1 from f < 1. This proves (i).
For (ii) simply note that the perfect foresight dynamic (8) for ® = 0 becomes
ytv0(1 ¡ yt) = (1 ¡ ¯)yt+1u0(yt+1), so for ¯ going to one the yt that solves it must
go to zero for any value of yt+1. This means that f(x) is pulled down arbitrarily
close to the x-axis. Further, from (9), when ® = 0, a critical point is given by
R(x) = 1 independently of ¯. So, as ¯ is increased all critical points (xc;f(xc))
move downwards along the same value of xc with f(xc) getting arbitrarily close to
the x-axis, so eventually all critical points go below the 45±-line.
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) For ¯ > 0, when ® becomes negative and su¢-
ciently large numerically, both the numerator and the denominator in (10) become
negative with the numerator numerically the largest, so f0(y(¯)) > 1.
(ii) When ® < 0, one sees from (10), that as ¯ goes to one, f0(y(¯)) goes to
®=® = 1. B numerator and denominator become negative for a large enough ¯,
but the numerator is numerically the largest, so f0(y(¯)) goes to one fro
1+N(y(¯)). As ¯ goes to one, y(¯) goes to zero (Proposition A), and hence f0(y(¯))
goes to
1¡R(0)
1+N(0), which is less than -1 exactly because R(0) > 2+N(0). If lim¯!1f0(y(¯)) <
¡1, then from continuity also f0(y(¯)) < ¡1 for all large enough ¯. Hence y(¯)
is indeterminate, which su¢ces for the existence of SSE close to it. When f is
globally well-de…ned and known to stay below a
19Btransition probabilities, such that (14) is ful…lled, then there are also y0;y00 with
0 < y0 < y00 < 1, such that y0 = f(y00) and y00 = f(y0). That is, if there is a
stationary Markov sunspot equilibrium SSE, then there is also a two-period cycle,
or, if there is no two-period cycle, then there is no SSE either.
Proof.7 One can safely assume that all transition probabilities ful…ll qij > 0.8
For each i = 1;:::;r de…ne,
y
min





i := arg max
j2f1;:::;rg
v2(yi;yj):
Since from (14), each v1(yi) is an average of the r values of v2(yi;yj), j = 1;:::;r,
one must have v2(yi;ymin
i ) ￿ v1(yi) ￿ v2(yi;ymax
i ) for i = 1;:::;r. In particular for
i = 1 and r,
v2(y1;y
min





r ) ￿ v1(yr) ￿ v2(yr;y
max
r ):
Since v2 is decreasing in its …rst argument we have: v2(yr;ymax
r ) ￿ v2(y1;ymax
r ) ￿
v2(y1;ymax
1 ), and v2(y1;ymin
1 ) ¸ v2(yr;ymin
1 ) ¸ v2(yr;ymin
r ). So, now using that v1(yi)
is strictly increasing in yi, we get,
v2(yr;y
min
r ) ￿ v2(y1;y
min
1 ) ￿ v1(y1) < v1(yr) ￿ v2(yr;y
max
r ) ￿ v2(y1;y
max
1 ):
Part of this is v2(y1;ymin
1 ) < v2(y1;ymax
1 ), and since all transition probabilities q1j
are strictly positive, one gets v1(y1) > v2(y1;ymin
1 ). Similarly, v1(yr) < v2(yr;ymax
r ).
We have thus established,
v2(y1;y
min
1 ) < v1(y1) ￿ v1(y2) ￿ ¢ ¢ ¢ ￿ v1(yr) < v2(yr;y
max
r ): (15)
For one i, one has yi = ymin
1 , and hence v1(ymin
1 ) > v2(y1;ymin
1 ) ¸ v2(ymin
1 ;ymin
1 ),
where the latter follows since v2 is decreasing in its …rst argument. Hence, v1(ymin
1 ) >
7This proof extends the result of Grandmont (1986) from the case where v2 is independent of
yi, to the case where v2 is weakly decreasing in yi.
8We appeal here to known results. For dynamic systems as considered here, if there is a
deterministic cycle, that is, a completely non-stochastic SSE where for each i, only one qij is
greater than zero (equal to one), then there is also a fully stochastic SSE where all qij are strictly
positive. By the same reasoning, if there is an SSE where for each i, some, but not all, qij are
strictly positive, then there is also a fully stochastic SSE, cf. Guesnerie and Woodford (1992).
21v2(ymin
1 ;ymin
1 ), but this implies that f(ymin
1 ) < ymin
1 . (Remember that f(ymin
1 ) is the
solution in z to v1(z) = v2(z;ymin
1 ). For z = ymin
1 , one gets ”strictly larger than”.
The solution is then to be found strictly below ymin
1 , since v1 is strictly increasing,
and v2 is decreasing, in z). Similarly, for one i, one must have yi = ymax
r , so
v1(ymax
r ) < v2(yr;ymax
r ) ￿ v2(ymax
r ;ymax
r ), implying f(ymax
r ) > ymax
r . So, we have
both f(ymin
1 ) < ymin
1 and f(ymax
r ) > ymax









Otherwise one would have f(ymin
1 ) < ymin
1 < ymax
r < f(ymax
r ), which from the con-
tinuity and f < 1 parts of Assumption 2 would imply the existence of a monetary
steady state strictly between ymin
1 and ymax
r , and one strictly above ymax
r , contra-
dicting the uniqueness of monetary steady state part of Assumption 2.
Also from(15), one has directly that v1(y1) > v2(y1;ymin
1 ), which implies f(ymin
1 ) <
y1 (by the same reasoning as above), and similarly v1(yr) < v2(yr;ymax
r ), implying
f(ymax
r ) > yr. Since also y1 ￿ ymax
r , and ymin
1 ￿ yr, one has,
f(y
min







Combining the two last displayed inequalities gives,
f(y
min







Given that f is continuous and stays below the ”ceiling” one, this su¢ces for the
existence of a two period cycle: Note that the obtained inequality states that f
has a negative slope below minus one over an interval around the steady state, not
necessarily in…nitesimally close to it. However, the kind of non-local negative slope
below minus one obtained su¢ces from a standard argument. If one constructs the
mirror image of f around the 45±-line then this has, under the obtained condition
and Assumption 2, to intersect f itself at two points y0 and y00 di¤erent from the
steady state. These y0 and y00 de…ne a two-period cycle.
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